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ABSTRACT—Most recognize that federal and state laws imposing high 
sentences and reducing judicial sentencing discretion have created 
America’s current plague of mass incarceration. Fewer realize that these 
draconian laws shift sentencing power to prosecutors: defendants fear the 
immense sentences they face if convicted at trial, and therefore actively 
engage in the plea bargaining process. This allows prosecutors, rather than 
judges, to effectively determine the sentences imposed in most cases, 
which creates significant sentencing discrepancies that most often are 
unrecorded and cannot be measured. This Essay proposes a solution that 
would not require legislative change to be put into effect: to have 
prosecutors occasionally serve as defense counsel for indigent defendants 
so prosecutors realize the great power they possess. Unfortunately, I 
recognize that such change is unlikely to happen in the near future, leaving 
prosecutors in power in the criminal justice system.  
AUTHOR—U.S. District Judge, S.D.N.Y. This Essay is adapted from a 
speech given by Judge Rakoff at the Conference on Democratizing 
Criminal Justice held at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of 
Law on November 18, 2016. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1430 
Most prosecutors in the United States are dedicated public servants 
whose primary aim and satisfaction is to bring criminals to justice. Within 
the adversary system, however, they represent only one point of view, and 
under our system of justice, we leave it to neutral players—judges—to 
resolve competing points of view. Where, instead, when the advocates for 
one side are given near-total power over the resolution of such disputes, 
balance is lost and abuses are inevitable. This is what has happened over 
the past few decades in the United States, with prosecutors increasingly 
being thrust into the role, not of advocates, but of rulers—with very 
unfortunate results. 
The plea bargain is the ultimate source of this ever-increasing 
prosecutorial power. It lacks both constitutional and historical grounding; 
indeed, it barely existed before the Civil War. But thereafter, a combination 
of circumstances—such as the dislocations following that tragic conflict, 
the flood of destitute immigrants arriving in the United States in the late 
nineteenth century, and the increase in effective U.S. police techniques 
modeled on the “Bobbies” of England—led to prosecutors charging far 
more persons with criminal offenses than U.S. judges and juries could 
possibly handle. To deal with this overload, prosecutors increasingly 
offered criminal defendants the opportunity to plead to lesser charges, and 
the “plea bargain” was born.1 
After a while, plea bargaining took on a life of its own. While the 
Supreme Court initially regarded the practice with some skepticism, by the 
middle of the twentieth century it had become an accepted feature of the 
U.S. criminal justice system.2 In the 1970 case of North Carolina v. Alford, 
the Supreme Court even went so far as to accept as constitutional a 
defendant’s guilty plea to second-degree murder, even when he asserted he 
was innocent of any murder but was pleading guilty to avoid the likelihood 
of a conviction of the capital offense of first-degree murder.3 
Nonetheless, for most of the twentieth century until the 1970s, roughly 
15% to 20% of those charged with federal criminal offenses whose cases 
were not dismissed by the prosecutor still went to trial;4 and, although the 
statistics for state jurisdictions are less readily available, they appear to be 
similar overall.5 This had a salutary effect: with prosecutors unsure of 
1 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10, 19, 25, 
34–35 (1979). 
2 Id. at 6, 26.  
3 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
4 Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 151, 155 
& fig.1, 196–97 (2005). 
5 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004).  
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whether a case might go to trial after all, they not only had to be prepared 
to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but also had to be 
cognizant that their conduct and the conduct of the police agents might be 
scrutinized by a court of law in pretrial suppression hearings or during trial 
itself. 
Moreover, throughout most of the twentieth century, the plea bargain 
served to place a maximum “cap” on the sentence that might be imposed, 
but otherwise sentencing discretion was left to the judge. For example, 
when I was a federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York in 
the 1970s, the office policy was never to recommend a sentence, but rather 
to leave the judge unfettered discretion to sentence the defendant anywhere 
in the typically very broad range between zero and the statutory maximum 
without any input from the prosecution. In nearby state court, the practice 
was nominally different—prosecutors would seek advanced judicial 
approval for a defendant to plead guilty to an offense for which he would 
be guaranteed a sentence within a specified range. However, the range was 
typically so broad (e.g., “five to fifteen years”) as to still give the judge 
substantial sentencing discretion.  
Material changes to the plea bargaining system occurred after crime 
rates began to rise dramatically, beginning in the mid-1960s and peaking in 
1995.6 In response to these increased crime rates, Congress and the state 
legislatures enacted laws that for most crimes imposed much higher 
sentences and greatly reduced judicial sentencing discretion. These 
included laws imposing lengthy mandatory minimum sentences (such as 
five, ten, and twenty years in the case of many drug offenses), laws 
requiring life sentences and the like for “career offenders” (such as the 
“three strikes” law in California), and sentencing “guidelines” that in 
practice dictated severe sentences in most cases (such as the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory before 2005).7 
The most prominent effect of these laws has been the terrible mass 
incarceration that continues to plague this country. Currently, 2.2 million 
people, mostly young men of color, are in jail or prison—far more than in 
any other country in the world.8 Another effect has been to cause innocent 
people to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk that, if they go to trial and 
6 See Gary LaFree, Book Review, Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 269, 270 (2000). 
7 See, e.g., Nathan Greenblatt, How Mandatory Are Mandatory Minimums? How Judges Can Avoid 
Imposing Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2008); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 199–200, 208, 222 (1993).  
8 Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT (2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-
justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/6CAK-GNMN].  
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are convicted on the heavy and multiple charges that prosecutors now 
typically include in indictments (in part to promote plea bargaining),9 they 
will face huge sentences that most judges will have little power or incentive 
to mitigate. For instance, of the more than 340 convicted felons who, 
through the work of the Innocence Project, were subsequently exonerated 
and freed, a full 10% had pleaded guilty to crimes that they were later 
proved to have never committed.10  
But a less-noticed effect of these draconian laws has been to shift 
sentencing power to the prosecutors. Now, under intense pressure to find 
ways to avoid the immense sentences they will face if they go to trial and 
are convicted, virtually all defendants—whether innocent or guilty—beg 
prosecutors to let them plead to reduced charges. The statistics bear witness 
to this shift. For decades, as noted, 15% to 20% of federal defendants went 
to trial.11 But as soon as mandatory minimums and mandatory guidelines 
took effect in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the percentage began to 
rapidly decrease: by 2000 only 5% of all federal defendants (reportedly 
even a smaller percentage of state defendants) went to trial.12 In 2015, only 
2.9% of federal defendants went to trial, and, although the state statistics 
are still being gathered, it may be as low as less than 2%.13 These tiny 
percentages have remained relatively constant in the 2000s even though 
crime rates have steadily and dramatically declined since 1996, so that the 
system can no longer claim to be “overloaded.”  
The net result is that prosecutors, rather than judges, now effectively 
determine the sentences to be imposed in most cases. They do this in plea 
bargains hammered out in the prosecutors’ offices in unrecorded 
conversations with defense counsel—sessions in which, because of the 
pressure on defendants to reduce their sentencing exposure, the prosecutors 
effectively hold most of the cards. Furthermore, not only are these sessions 
secret, one-sided, and lacking judicial oversight, but also the results vary 
materially from prosecutor to prosecutor. Thus, the sentencing 
9 Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 701 (2014). 
10 DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT (2016), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/R8XL-H2JL].  
11 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
12 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2000, at 53
(2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs00.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MC8-FP7J]; see MATTHEW 
R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2000, at 9 tbl.10, 10 (2003), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc00.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9NR-GV2E]. The corresponding 
5% trial rate for state defendants only included defendants charged with a felony.  
13 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES—FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 4 
(2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/279K-YXHM]. 
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discrepancies (i.e., substantially different sentences for the same crime) that 
the statutory sentencing guidelines were intended to reduce still occur. 
Even more troubling is that without oversight, no one can even begin to 
measure the extent of such discrepancy. 
What can be done about this unfortunate shift of power from judges to 
prosecutors, that is, from neutrals to advocates? The most obvious, and 
best, solution would be a repeal of mandatory minimum and career 
offender laws (something the federal judiciary has requested for several 
decades) and a considerable reduction in the sentences “recommended” by 
sentencing guidelines. But although a growing recognition of the costs and 
evils of mass incarceration has fostered some bipartisan efforts in this 
direction, it appears unlikely to command the support of the new federal 
administration or of the many state legislatures whose members know that 
it is still good politics to be “tough on crime.” Moreover, even if U.S. 
sentences were made considerably less draconian than current laws require 
them to be, it is unlikely that prosecutors, having now realized the power 
that plea bargaining gives them to effectively determine sentences, would 
voluntarily relinquish that power in circumstances where the sentences 
were less severe. 
So, what about doing away with plea bargaining altogether? This, in 
fact, is the status quo in many European countries. In Germany, for 
example, where plea bargains are officially not recognized (though they do 
occur, sub rosa, in a few cases), roughly 50% of all criminal cases go to 
trial, and most of the remaining cases are resolved through de facto pleas to 
the initial charges.14 Unfortunately, the plea bargain system is now so 
embedded in the American criminal justice system that, notwithstanding 
the great decrease in crime since 1995 mitigating the practical need for plea 
bargaining, there does not appear to be any vocal support for doing away 
with plea bargains altogether. 
Some more modest, halfway measures have been suggested. Years 
ago, the late Professor James Vorenberg of Harvard Law School suggested 
that the Department of Justice promulgate binding regulations, similar to 
those enacted by administrative agencies, that would govern plea 
14 Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1532 
(2010); Cornelius Nestler, Sentencing in Germany, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 109, 116 (2003) (“[I]n 
roughly 50% of all cases the prosecution acts on the basis of the assumption that there is sufficient 
reason to believe that a crime was committed; in these cases, the prosecutors then decide either to bring 
about an indictment in court, to apply in writing for a penal order, or to conclude the cases according to 
sections 153 and 153a of the Procedural Code that allow for a termination of the proceedings by the 
prosecutor.”).  
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bargaining in the federal government.15 Yet, when Vorenberg himself 
became Director of the Justice Department’s Office of Criminal Justice in 
the Kennedy Administration—a position in which he was supposed to 
promulgate major policy initiatives—he was unable to get anyone to back 
his proposal. Aside from the fact that most of the criminal justice system is 
administered by the states, Vorenberg’s proposal encountered opposition 
based on the concern that administrative oversight of federal plea 
bargaining would create satellite litigation that would hamper the speed 
with which criminal defendants were brought to trial—always a key aim of 
any criminal justice system that aspires to meaningful deterrence.16 That 
same objection could rightly be made today.  
In a more recent variation on Vorenberg’s proposal, Professor 
Stephanos Bibas has proposed that various prosecutorial agencies, state and 
federal, each adopt some internal guidelines that, while not enforceable by 
outside parties, would nevertheless bring some order to prosecutors’ 
exercise of discretion in the plea bargaining process.17 Although I admire 
Professor Bibas, I am skeptical that this would have much effect. When I 
was a young prosecutor, there stood on my bookshelf a multi-volume work 
of the then-existing internal rules for federal prosecutors entitled the “U.S. 
Attorneys Manual.” I never opened it, and I don’t think any of my 
colleagues did either. We learned what the “rules” were from our more 
senior colleagues; and if what they told us was wrong or misguided, there 
was no one—individual or agency—to correct them. I suspect this is still 
the case. Moreover, only the prosecutor assigned to a case really knows the 
evidence in the case; and if the prosecutor wanted to apply any putative 
internal plea bargain guidelines so as to fit the result she desired (whether 
harsh or lenient, depending on her personality and ideology), she could 
easily interpret the evidence so as to fit her disposition, and no chief would 
know enough to say her nay. When not put to the test of the adversary 
system, evidence is almost always “flexible” in this way. 
Two years ago, in an essay in the New York Review of Books, I 
proposed a variation on what is sometimes referred to as a “preliminary 
hearing.”18 Specifically, in my formulation, the prosecutor and defense 
15 See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1562–
65 (1981). 
16 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 912 (2009).  
17 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 957 (2006). 
18 Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2014), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/
8DRB-2GWA]. 
111:1429 (2017) Why Prosecutors Rule 
1435 
counsel would be required to appear shortly after indictment before a 
judicial officer, who would separately question them, in camera and under 
seal, as to what their evidence was, what discovery they would likely have, 
and what disposition they were seeking. The judicial officer, without 
revealing any of this information to the other side or to the judge who 
would be assigned to the case for all other purposes, would then 
recommend to the parties what leads still needed to be explored, what 
disclosures needed to be made, and, where appropriate, what the judicial 
officer thought would be a fair disposition of the case. In other words, the 
judicial officer would, in effect, oversee the plea bargaining process and, 
while not having the power to force either side to his view, could use her 
persuasive powers to assure a fairer, more neutral process. 
A variation on this proposal is currently in practice in the State of 
Connecticut and has achieved good reviews from prosecutors and defense 
counsel alike.19 Nevertheless, it is currently forbidden by the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, when I tried to persuade my immediate 
colleagues to try a pilot variation that could be done, on consent of all 
involved, even under the prevailing rules, I was met with strong 
resistance—the primary objection being that such an early involvement in 
the criminal process would compromise judicial neutrality. This objection 
ignores the fact that the bulk of action in the current federal criminal 
process occurs during the plea bargaining stage. For a judge to not get 
involved at that stage is to guarantee, in effect, no meaningful judicial 
involvement in the process at all. Nevertheless, I accept that this proposal is 
not proving to be attractive. 
Finally, I come back to a very modest proposal that I first made in 
1976—only to have it immediately shot down by the country’s most 
prominent prosecutor. The occasion was the visit of then-Attorney General 
of the United States, Edward H. Levi, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Manhattan, following his single-handed restoration of order and neutrality 
to the Department of Justice in the wake of Watergate. After an inspiring 
speech, Levi entertained questions, and I asked him whether, in order to 
make prosecutors more conscious of their obligation to do justice rather 
than just secure convictions, it might be a good idea to have prosecutors 
occasionally serve as defense counsel—a practice permitted in the United 
Kingdom. Showing that he was still a “Paper Chase” law professor at heart, 
Levi responded: “That’s not a wholly bad idea, not wholly bad!” I slunk 
away in shame.  
19 See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 247–56 (2006). 
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Nevertheless, I am now shameless enough to think it is a good idea. 
Under my plan, state and federal prosecutors would be required to spend 
six months out of every three years of their term (three years is the 
minimum term required of most federal prosecutors) serving as defense 
counsel for indigent defendants, with the defendants’ consent and subject to 
the supervision of the local legal aid supervisor. In some cases, to avoid 
conflicts, the prosecutor in one locale might serve his time as defense 
counsel in another locale. I can think of no other step more likely to make 
prosecutors aware of the great power they possess or the need to temper it 
with other considerations. 
I do not believe that this last proposal would require any legislative 
change to be put into effect, though it would, of course, require the consent 
of both prosecutorial and legal aid offices. (Many legal aid offices, for 
reasons that will not bear scrutiny, will never hire former prosecutors as 
legal aid lawyers, even though the reverse is not true.) Unfortunately, I am 
also quite confident that the idea is too great a departure from existing U.S. 
practice to meet with quick approval. 
So I end with the not very optimistic conclusion that, for the 
immediate future at least, prosecutors, rather than judges, will be the real 
rulers of the American criminal justice system. And I ask you: is that fair? 
